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INTRODUCTION TO INCOME TAX
POLICY FORMULATION: CANADA
1972-76
By A. B. C. DRACHE*
A. INTRODUCTION
The decade ending on December 31, 1971 saw the most intensive dis-
cussion of tax policy and theory which has ever taken place in Canada, or
perhaps any country. On January 1, 1972, the "reformed" Income Tax Act
became effective, bringing to an end the debate initiated by the Carter Royal
Commission, and continued by the White Paper and the Parliamentary de-
bates. Yet it is arguable that the period since 1971 has produced more change
in the Income Tax Act than did the reform period. Much of this, critics
charge, was an undoing of reform. Others suggest that the most significant
reforms, including tax indexing, took place after 1971. Whatever one's pbilo-
sophical view of the changes, it is unarguable that the volume of post-1971
changes is immense and that the amendments were very often fundamental.
The purpose of this article is not to examine the nature of the changes
which took place during this period, but rather to consider the inputs in-
volved in making the changes. These inputs are significant since, in contrast
to the openness of the tax reform decade, they are mostly hidden from view.
A brief review of the criteria considered in enacting statutory amendments
and the various groups, in both the public and the private sectors, which have
input into the decision-making process will provide a useful starting point
from which to consider the other articles in this issue dealing with specialized
areas of tax policy.
0 Copyright, 1978, A. B. C. Drache.
Mr. Drache is a member of the Ontario Bar. He acted as Chief of the Personal
Income Tax Section of the Department of Finance from 1972 until 1976.
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B. AMENDMENT PROCEDURES
Amendments to the Income Tax Act are publicly proposed in the Budget
address and the Ways and Means motion which accompanies the Budget.
The decisions which go into amending the Act are made anywhere from several
months to a few days before the Budget is presented. The largest group of
amendments are nonbudgetary or technical. The process of dealing with
these begins soon after the previous Budget has been announced. It is pri-
marily an internal operation within the Department of Finance: most of the
decisions are made by officials rather than the Minister. In the vast majority
of cases, ministerial approval is pro forma.
The second group of amendments are the budgetary changes, the high
profile amendments which highlight any Budget.' The budgetary items are
usually dealt with in the period between the announcement of the Budget and
the delivery of the Budget Address. These items tend to involve much more
input from the senior officials and from the Minister of Finance and his
colleagues.
While work on the Budget ranges over many branches of the Department
of Finance, the vast majority of the work done on the Income Tax Act is done
by the Tax Policy and Federal-Provincial Relations Branch. Three divisions
of this Branch have been primarily responsible for amendments to the Act:
the Business and Corporations Division, the International Division and the
Personal Tax and Quantitative Analysis Division.2 The personnel of these
divisions consisted primarily of lawyers and accountants, although a few eco-
nomists were added to do quantitative analysis. During the period 1973-75,
lawyers and accountants were evenly represented; recently, however, a num-
ber of lawyers have left, and most of the replacements have been accountants.
The usual practice is to allocate an area of specialization to each officer
so that there is at least one person familiar with its problems. This has re-
sulted in individual officers having a considerable amount of influence in their
area. Thus the key person behind any nonbudgetary change may be a junior
officer who nevertheless commands the confidence of his seniors. For most of
the technical amendments, the officer in charge will prepare a memorandum
which sets out the problem, his analysis and a recommendation. These mem-
oranda are compiled in a single volume, "The Black Book." Prior to a Bud-
get, the Black Book recommendations are reviewed at a meeting attended by
the officer in charge, his superiors, and the Assistant Deputy Minister. Each
memorandum is examined and a decision is made as to whether to proceed
with a statutory amendment.
At a later stage, all the recommended changes are brought together into
a "Budget Black Book" for presentation to the Minister. This presentation
will usually be made by the Assistant Deputy Minister, who may or may not be
accompanied by some of the other officers in the Department. If the Minister
1 These terms are used internally in the Department of Finance but it should be
noted that the distinction is not always clear-cut.
2 Over the years, these divisions have been reshuffled and undergone various name
changes.
[VOL. 16, NO. I
Tax Policy
approves, as he does of more than ninety-five percent of the technical changes,
the officer in charge is then required to prepare a draft of the legislation. Ulti-
mately, this draft becomes the working draft which is submitted to the Depart-
ment of Justice for the final drafting of the Bill, along with the original
memorandum and any other notes which the officer thinks the Justice drafts-
man should have. After the Justice draft has been completed, it is reviewed
at a meeting of the Justice draftsman, the officer from Finance in charge of
the amendment, and representatives from Revenue Canada who will have the
task of translating the legislation into practice.
C. CRITERIA APPLIED TO STATUTORY AMENDMENTS
1. Objectives of the Tax System
Because of the nature of the decision-making process, the criteria which
are applied will differ from situation to situation. The classic objectives of a
taxation system include equity, neutrality, administrative feasibility, and maxi-
mization of revenue yield. The weighting of these elements will vary from
individual to individual; when a superior overrules a subordinate, it is often
because he has given a different priority to one factor.
(a) Equity
Despite what the cynics might claim, in the vast majority of issues con-
sidered, equity is a major factor in the determination of the result. However,
equity is rarely discussed in an abstract manner; rather, the discussions are
approached in the light of "fairness," "discrimination" and the possibility of
conferring undue advantage.
No amendments are made without some discussion of these factors, but
the question of tax equity is itself a subjective matter, and therefore the appli-
cation of equity as a criterion does not of itself resolve problems.
For instance, the original deduction under section 110.1 was for up to
$1,000 of interest income. 3 It was designed, in part, to protect a modest
amount of capital from the effects of inflation. That is to say, it was assumed
that if one had $10,000 of capital yielding ten percent and the rate of inflation
was ten percent, it would be "inequitable" to tax the yield. Of course, there
were those who argued that the deduction itself was "inequitable" because
it gave no relief to those who did not have the capital to protect, that it was
a rich man's deduction. When the deduction was introduced for a second time
in November, 1974, it included $1,000 of "grossed-up" dividends. This
change again was made for reasons of "equity." First, it was held to be "un-
fair" to give relief only to those who held debt, as opposed to those who held
equity for investment purposes. Second, the amendment was equitable in that
it would reduce the incentive to invest in debt (rather than equity) which had
been created by the original proposal, and was thus "fairer" to the equity
markets. There is room for argument as to whether equity was served or
destroyed by the original deduction and by the extension.4
8 This proposal was announced in the May 1974 Budget, effective retroactively to
January 1, 1974.
4For fuller discussion of this provision, see M. A. Cohen, Tax Simplification
(1975), 27 Can. Tax Foundation Tax Conference 7 at 7.
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Issues of equity were not limited to major amendments such as the
interest dividend deduction. Most of the technical amendments dealing with
"anomalies" really represented the elimination of situations in which tax was
exigible if a transaction occurred in one manner as opposed to another, al-
though the economic or social effect might be identical. This differential treat-
ment was considered "unfair" and the Act was amended scores of times to
eliminate such anomalies. Such amendments as the changes in the taxation of
"deemed residents," usually service personnel overseas, were based on equi-
table considerations. Prior to the amendment, deemed residents, who were
taxed as if they were resident, were precluded from taking certain deductions
because the expenses were not incurred in Canada.
The major obstacle to achieving equity is the fact that full equity means
a highly complex Act. Most of the arcane provisions of the Act result from
the attempt to achieve fairness. The Act often starts off with a broad rule, in
many instances a harsh rule, and then provides exceptions to it on the grounds
of fairness. As more and more situations appear to be analogous to those for
which an exception has been granted, more exceptions are made. The end
result is that the provision becomes complex in the extreme.5 The officers are
thus faced with the task of fulfilling the equity goal at the cost of simplifica-
tion or, conversely, abandoning changes which might be desirable in policy
terms but are too complex to administer. At least one major change to the
child care expense deduction, which was approved at all levels on policy
grounds, was abandoned because the required legislation would be so com-
plicated as to defy understanding.
(b) Administrative Considerations
The ability of Revenue Canada to administer a provision, and of tax-
payers to comply with it, must be considered. Revenue Canada frequently
objected to a provision on administrative grounds, and, in many cases, Re-
venue's objection was enough to kill a proposal for a technical or low-level
budgetary change. However, Finance was often sceptical of this type of objec-
tion from Revenue because it was felt that, as a bureaucracy, Revenue would
almost invariably react negatively to changed procedures. From time to time,
changes were forced through which Revenue said could not be handled ad-
ministratively, but with which it subsequently managed to cope. 6
Taxpayers' complaints about their inability to comply with a provision
carried little weight, though occasionally such complaints were heeded. The
problem in this area was often that large organizations could cope with
changes, while smaller ones claimed they could not.
5 Id. at 9. For example, the Act states that when a person dies there is a deemed
realization of his capital assets, resulting in a capital gain or loss. Then a special rule
creates an exception when the property is left outright to the deceased's spouse. This
in turn requires rules which govern the tax consequences on the death of the spouse.
A parallel set of rules must be applied in cases where the property is left in trust for
the spouse. This necessitates exceptions to the normal trust rules for spousal trusts and
the application of different rules when the spousal trust property is distributed. So
starting from a basic rule, we arrive at a battery of provisions designed to recognize
the fairness of not taxing property when it passes to a spouse.
6 This was particularly true of the two sets of proposals in 1974.
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(c) Cost
Most of the amendments which are made to the Income Tax Act are
essentially costless since they deal primarily with technical matters and the
ultimate cost, if any, is so remote as to be unmeasurable. For example, a
particular change may delay the imposition of a tax from the date of a tax-
payer's death until the date of the death of his wife. The cost of such a change
cannot, in practical terms, be computed.
Yet clearly there are situations in which cost is a factor. One of the roles
of the quantitative analysis unit is to try to determine the cost of a proposal.
The estimates are often sheer guess work, simply because no estimate can be
made of public reaction to a new programme.7 In other cases, the unit can
estimate the cost with total accuracy. Normally, major cost items are treated
as budgetary matters. Interestingly enough, the fiscal stance of the Budget
dictates whether cost is a negative or positive factor in deciding whether a
change should be made. In some years, the government must, to use Depart-
mental jargon, "give away" hundreds of millions of dollars. In such a case,
the fact that a particular amendment might be high cost, i.e., the government
will forego substantial revenues, will be an attractive feature. In other years,
when there is a need to raise taxes, high cost items are abandoned and tech-
nical changes which have the effect of raising revenues are welcomed by
the Department.
It should, however, be pointed out that often even technical changes may
have a high cost. For instance, it was once proposed that the personal deduc-
tion of immigrants and emigrants no longer be prorated by the number of
days they were resident in Canada.8 This was viewed as a minor simplification
of the tax returns. When the proposal was costed, as are all proposals which
may have a cost factor, it was found that this simplification would cost tens
of millions of dollars in a year of belt tightening. The suggestion was dropped.
2. Political Considerations
In dealing with technical amendments, little consideration was given to
political ramifications, primarily because such amendments have little impact
on the public at large and also because politicians are rarely in a position to
assess the consequences of technical amendments. Political considerations did
come into play to the extent that almost every amendment, technical or other-
wise, was assessed from the point of view of who would benefit and who
would bear the burden. The timing of the amendments, even technical changes,
was also viewed in the context of political considerations, which is why so-
called relieving amendments are often put into effect retroactively, while
tightening amendments never come into effect before Budget Day. It should
be pointed out that the officials looked at the effect on individuals, not so
7 For instance, nobody could accurately predict what percentage of those taxpayers
who were eligible would make a contribution to a registered home ownership savings
plan, nor how many who did contribute would make the maximum deduction. Indeed,
there was no way to accurately determine how many were eligible for the plan.
8That is, immigrants and emigrants would be treated in the same manner as a
couple who marry in the year or who have children born in the year.
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much from the point of view of generating votes, or the possibility of losing
them, but rather in regard to the equities of the situation. The Minister will
rarely turn down a technical amendment for "political" reasons.
The one general exception to the nonpolitical approach to technical
amendments arose during the period between the end of October, 1972 and
May, 1974, when the government was in a minority position. At this time,
the officials were very conscious of technical amendments which might offend
the philosophy of the New Democratic Party, who held the balance of power.
In preparing assessments of proposed tax changes, officials felt constrained,
although it was a self-imposed constraint, to point out any particular change
which might produce a negative reaction from the NDP. Many modifications
were made to draft proposals to avoid unnecessarily offending the opposition
throughout this period.
Budgetary changes, of course, were viewed in an entirely different con-
text. Such changes were usually instituted "from the top," and therefore the
lower echelon officials had little to do with the decision-making, other than
making technical assessments. Budgetary proposals were assessed in terms of
their economic and political impact. Where the changes were relieving in
nature, or were likely to produce a positive public reaction, they were high-
lighted in the Budget speech and in the supplementary materials provided to
the press, and were put at the beginning of the Ways and Means motion.
Normally, the Ways and Means motion roughly follows the order of the pro-
visions of the Act, but high profile items are usually placed near the beginning.
A classic example of the effect of political considerations on budgetary
proposals was the Budget of May, 1974, which was defeated, leading to the
July, 1974 election and the return of majority government. Probably no Bud-
get document in recent years contained more attractive provisions for the
majority of Canadian taxpayers. The government was fortunate in its timing
in that, as a matter of fiscal policy, it wanted to reduce taxes and encourage
savings. This Budget introduced such items as the interest income deduction,
the registered home ownership savings plan, the spousal registered retirement
savings plan, and a host of other taxpayer benefits. The government expected
the Budget to be the basis of its election campaign, and these provisions were
drafted as broadly as possible. It is not surprising, therefore, that by 1977,
each of these three major provisions has had to be substantially revised to
close up "loopholes" which the original draftsmen knew were present, but
were instructed to retain.9
When the November, 1974 Budget was being drawn up, the orders were,
in effect, to retain everything from the defeated Budget but to liberalize cer-
tain provisions. Thus, for instance, the interest deduction was extended to
cover dividends. This approach was taken in the belief that, since the cam-
paign had been waged in part on the aborted Budget, it would be unconscion-
able to retreat from the provisions which had de facto become part of the
campaign platform.
9In the 1977 Budget, each of these three 1974 amendments were significantly
tightened up, leading some observers to believe that there would be no election before
at least a "mini-Budget" was presented.
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3. Federal-Provincial Factors
Bearing in mind that nine provinces base their income tax on Federal
tax, it is interesting to note that, for the most part, amendments were con-
sidered without taking into account the provincial ramifications. Even funda-
mental changes, such as the indexing of the tax system, were in fact imposed
upon the provinces without consultation; this led to a number of public con-
frontations. 10 The most significant situations in which provincial factors were
considered were those in which amendments were made to combat provincial
actions, most notably in the celebrated fight over resource revenues between
Ottawa and the Western provinces. It should be pointed out that there were
a number of other occasions when Ottawa refused to give taxpayer deductions
for costs imposed unilaterally by a particular province, on the ground that
taxpayers across Canada should not be forced to share the costs of pro-
grammes, the benefits of which would accrue to only one province."
The Department was faced with another technical difficulty which arose
from the fact that provincial law varied. A provision based on the law of
Ontario would not have the same effect in some of the other provinces. For
instance, under the various provincial statutes governing the disposition of
property on death, a direction in an RRSP contract that, in the event of the
death of the annuitant, the property pass to his spouse, was accorded different
treatment than a similar testamentary disposition. In some provinces the con-
tractual provision was valid, in others it was void. When such discrepancies
were identified, and officials at Finance were satisfied that there was no alter-
native, the provisions of the Income Tax Act would be amended.
The lack of formal federal-provincial coordination on tax policy could
be rationalized in two ways. First, the concept of Budget secrecy demanded
that there be no consultation with respect to most issues. Second, even if
consultation could take place, it would probably have been impossible to
obtain a consensus on all changes. There was, however, a fair amount of
general discussion between Ottawa and the provinces at all levels on various
tax policy issues, and it cannot be said that Ottawa was unaware of the prob-
able provincial reaction to proposed changes. There was regular informal
contact between lower level officials throughout the year, so it is fair to say
that, in the context of major issues, Ottawa was quite aware of the provincial
positions, even if the province's position was not adopted. In the context of
conflict between federal and provincial legislation, it became clear that Finance
did not have enough lawyers versed in areas of the law other than tax law,
and that too few of the provinces were represented. Most of the Finance
lawyers were educated in Ontario, Quebec, and Manitoba, and had no general
legal experience outside the tax area.
10 See, for example, the contrasting views presented by officials of the federal and
Ontario governments in J. R. Allen et al., Indexing the Personal Income Tax: A Federal
Perspective (1974), 22 Can. Tax J. 355.
11 Typical of such a case would be a situation in which a particular province would
impose a levy in some form, either directly or indirectly, on a group within the province
and the group would ask for a tax deduction. In all cases, such deductions were denied
unless they fell within general existing provisions of the Act.
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Finally, there were conflicts both within the Act itself and in relation to
other federal statutes. For instance, a Canada Savings Bond was a qualified
investment for a registered retirement savings plan, but prior to 1975, could
not be owned by a trust.12 In this case, the rules relating to the holding of
bonds, rather than the tax rules, were changed. 13
D. POLICY FORMULATION
1. Sources of Input into Nonbudgetary Amendments
By far the majority of nonbudgetary changes originate from within the
Tax Policy Branch itself and from Revenue Canada. The tax policy officers
are more aware of the intricacies of the Act as it applies to their own special-
ties than any other single group in Canada, and a substantial portion of their
time is spent considering what changes may have to be made in their areas.
This process is complicated by the fact that changes in approach in one area
often necessitate changes in other areas, either to keep the overall approach
of the Act consistent or because a technical change will create problems in
another area. For instance, once it was decided to introduce the $1,000
interest/dividend deduction, consideration had to be given to the degree of
"flow-through" of these types of income from trusts, partnerships, mutual
fund corporations and employee profit sharing plans. These changes are
usually termed "consequential" in that they do not reflect a significant change
in approach per se, but rather are consequential upon a decision having been
made in an unrelated area.
Revenue Canada, of course, deals directly with the taxpayers and is
therefore aware of administrative difficulties, assessment problems and the
latest "schemes" of taxpayers. This department also receives many of the
complaints made by taxpayers, which are passed along to Finance. The offi-
cers in Revenue's Current Amendments Division (formerly known as Tax
Base Research) and Finance's Tax Policy Branch are in touch with each
other on a daily basis. While Revenue has many more officers working in the
area of tax policy than does Finance, the organization is similar, with areas
of responsibility being given to specific officers. As a result, the tax policy
officers can identify their counterparts at Revenue, and discuss problems with
them. It should be stressed that, for the most part, Revenue does not take
part in policy decisions. Revenue will set out the problem, whether it be ad-
ministrative or otherwise, leaving it to the Finance officials to do an assess-
ment and make the final recommendation. However, Revenue's desire for a
change in the law is a factor in determining whether a particular change will
be made.
Occasionally, when it is agreed that a change is urgently needed, one of
two procedures may be adopted. A formal press release may be issued by
Finance indicating that a change will be made in the next Budget effective
on a certain day, usually the date of the press release.' 4 More often, however,
12 Under the rules relating to bond sales this limitation was imposed to prevent one
trustee from "dumping" large quantities of C.S.B.'s at one time.
'3 But the changes were limited to allow only deferred income trusts to hold the
bonds, and even then, under strict rules.
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Finance may simply assure Revenue that a particular change will be made in
the next Budget, retroactively, and Revenue will instruct its officials to act
as though the change had already been made.
Interpretation Bulletins issued by Revenue are usually sent to Finance
for clearance, but it would appear that Revenue does not consider itself bound
by Finance in its interpretation of the law; occasionally it will even issue such
a Bulletin without Finance's concurrence. This may be one of the reasons
that Bulletins are issued which, immediately after the next Budget, are
inaccurate.";
There is a constant input of ideas from other government departments,
usually relating to their own projects. One of the most common methods for
any department of obtaining public acceptance of a project is to grant tax
concessions. Proposed tax concessions were usually rejected by Finance un-
less there was a Cabinet directive to the contrary. Such a directive was itself
rare because the Minister of Finance would usually oppose such a measure
in Cabinet, and would seldom be overruled.
The Secretary of State, however, successfully requested major changes
to the Act concerning aid to the Canadian fim industry and restrictions on
the solicitation of advertising by foreign media. Finance officials opposed
these concessions but were ultimately overruled. The same Secretary of State
was nevertheless able to enlist key Finance support for the tax concession
given with respect to the disposition of Heritage properties, and was able to
enlist the aid of Finance personnel in the drafting of the provisions in a
nontax Bill.
As a general proposition, however, Finance officials resented the attempts
of other departments to use the Income Tax Act for their own purposes.,,
Parliamentary input into the policy-making process was minimal, pri-
marily because few members of Parliament had the requisite technical knowl-
edge to make useful suggestions in other than budgetary areas, and the
budgetary areas were essentially reserved for the Minister himself. Letters
from M.P.'s and Senators were always graciously answered, but carried little
weight with the officials. Opposition questions in Parliament, and remarks
during Budget debates, were always monitored so that the Minister could
reply to them, but for the most part they were not given significant weight in
evaluating amendments (except to a limited degree during the period of the
minority government from 1972-74).
On the other hand, the Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and Com-
14 This is most common where the changes are to the Regulations.
15See for instance, Interpretation Bulletin IT-178R. Paragraph 11 states that no
deduction may be claimed for new home purchase expenses. Bill C-56 proposes to
change that, retroactive to January 1, 1977. The Bill was tabled on June 15, 1977. The
Bulletin is dated July 4, 1977.
16 Other departments may also have an input through so-called inter-departmental
committees which are often set up to study specific problems of broad interest. The
reports of such committees are, however, not binding on Finance unless backed up by
some Cabinet directive.
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merce was accorded respect, as much for its experience as for its status.
Senators like Salter Hayden and Laz Phillips were acknowledged as having
expertise, and the committee usually had counsel with the resources of a
top-notch law firm behind them. Committee counsel always consulted with
Finance officials before the hearings took place, so that there was no risk of
mutual embarrassment. On a number of occasions, so as not to delay the Bill
currently under discussion, Finance officials would undertake that a particular
amendment would be made in the future, and such undertakings were always
recorded and honoured. Among most of the officials, the Senate committee
was held in greater respect than any other Parliamentary body, both for its
capabilities and for its impartiality.
Most backbenchers, whether part of the government or in oppositions,
played no role in policy formation. However, the government caucus did
have the power to force through amendments in the Act. The power of the
caucus was illustrated during the second reading of the November, 1974
Budget Tax Bill in January, 1975. The Bill contained the interest/dividend
deduction, which was structured so that the deduction applied only to net
interest/dividend income, i.e., net after interest charges had been deducted.
This was intended to ensure that one could not borrow money to generate
the interest, which would be tax-free, but deduct the interest on the borrowed
money. During internal discussions, Revenue indicated that this approach was
necessary from an administrative point of view because they could not deter-
mine how the proceeds of any particular loan were used, except in the most
simple cases. The Minister at the time, the Honourable John Turner, concurred.
Once the Bill became widely known, however, he came under sharp
attack in his own caucus, particularly from those members representing rural
ridings, since farmers, who were for the most part unincorporated, often had
a heavy interest burden in respect of their farm operations which would eli-
minate any benefit under the new deduction. Turner capitulated and the
deduction became a gross deduction, leading to an increase in borrowing in
order to generate tax deductions.
Tax officials were amazed at his capitulation. One ventured that Turner
must be on his way out if he could not muster the strength to beat back a
few dissidents in caucus on a matter of such fiscal importance. Though
Turner did present one more Budget, he did in fact leave within ten months
of the incident.
The Cabinet itself had relatively little input into tax policy. While the
Minister consulted the Prime Minister in advance of the Budget, the Cabinet
would learn of the contents just a short time before Budget Day, usually
when there was little time for change. Occasionally, a Cabinet colleague
would convince the Minister of the need for a particular change in the Act
of a technical nature. For instance, some of the partnership changes relating
to retired partners were made primarily because the Minister of Justice was
having trouble getting senior lawyers to accept judgeships because of the tax
consequences of leaving a practice.17 But even this sort of change was ap-
17 Most notably, sections 96(1.1) and 98.1.
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proved by Finance officials from a technical point of view, and it was more
common for the Minister of Finance to send a sympathetic letter to a col-
league about a recommended change, without committing himself. Happily
for him, the tradition of Budget secrecy could be relied upon to ensure that
no formal commitment had to be made.
A significant source of outside input into tax policy was the series of
annual meetings between various interest groups and either officials or the
Minister. Typical of these are the annual meetings with the Chamber of
Commerce, the Canadian Labour Congress, and most importantly, the Joint
Taxation Committee of the Canadian Bar Association and the Canadian In-
stitute of Chartered Accountants. Where the meeting is well organized, the
written brief will be submitted to the department sometime in advance, so
that the specific proposals can be assessed and appropriate responses pre-
pared for the Minister.
The annual session with the Joint Committee is the most important of
these meetings for a number of reasons. The proposals are usually very tech-
nical and it is in this area that a change is most likely to be made. All offi-
cials, down to the most junior level, attend the meeting to discuss mutual
problems. The Committee itself is usually made up of genuine experts, not
merely the titular heads of the two organizations, and the continuity of mem-
bership on the Committee helps in dealing with recurring problems.
In addition to annual meetings, delegations are often sent by various
industries or interest groups to discuss particular problems. Groups represent-
ing the insurance industry, trust companies and investment dealers often
meet with officials. These groups have apparently recognized that in terms
of both technical changes and budgetary changes, the key element in success
is convincing the officials of the merit of their position. Meeting the Minister
does not necessarily produce results, except in terms of mutual public relations.
Tax policy officials carefully follow all published material about the tax
system. Periodicals from Canada and abroad are closely read and widely
circulated. In addition, Revenue Canada has a newspaper clipping service,
and the clippings are circulated within the Tax Policy Branch. The foreign
publications are primarily of interest to those dealing with international taxa-
tion, although ideas from abroad are occasionally considered for possible
application in the domestic system. Canadian articles are very closely read,
but are seldom helpful, either because the author is unaware of the ramifica-
tions of his recommendations, or because his ideas have already been drawn
by Finance from some other source.
Speeches at various tax conferences, notably those given at the Canadian
Tax Foundation annual conference, also receive careful attention. Primarily
this is because the speakers are of an extremely high calibre, and because the
speeches tend to be highly technical. In practical terms, a forty minute address
on "tax simplification" is of little use, while a forty minute address which
indicates that one paragraph of the Act does not mesh perfectly in all cir-
cumstances with another subsection may be extremely useful. Accordingly,
Finance assigns one of the attendees at the Tax Conference to get copies of
every address at the time of the conference, rather than wait six or eight
months until the report is published.
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A few words relating to the influence of case law on amendments may
be appropriate. The lawyers in Tax Policy follow the reported cases and
will occasionally react to a major decision. A decision which seems contrary
to policy may be pushed aside as an anomaly based on its specific facts. Only
when such a decision relates to the drafting of the statute and appears to
have wide ramifications will amendments be made. Classic examples of such
changes were the statutory amendments made as a result of the Wip f s and
Quinn19 cases. Revenue is careful to bring significant unreported decisions to
the attention of Finance. Occasionally, Finance may even be consulted as to
whether a particular case should be appealed, although there is no evidence
that Finance's views on the subject will necessarily be followed.
As has been stated, Revenue is the Department which has the most direct
contact with the public, but there is a large flow of correspondence from the
public directed to the Minister of Finance, and occasionally to the Depart-
ment, dealing with tax matters. These letters cover everything from proposing
major changes in the tax system to small technical problems. The vast ma-
jority of these letters are answered by the "letter writing unit" of the Informa-
tion Services Division. However, a significant percentage of the "tax" letters
are technical in nature and are answered by the Tax Policy Officers. Indeed,
one of the most onerous aspects of the officer's work is the drafting of replies.
Many letters deal with the same questions, and at one time a book of form
answers was produced dealing with about fifty recurring issues, such as making
Canada Savings Bond interest tax free, doing away with the life annuity re-
quirement of registered retirement savings plans, making employee expenses
deductible on an itemized basis and so forth.
Rarely is a letter from a member of the public instrumental in bringing
about a change in the law. Letter writing campaigns are for the most part
counter-productive, because they have the effect of irritating everyone in-
volved without convincing them that there is a real commitment to change
among a substantial number of taxpayers. Occasionally, however, a letter
raises a new issue which does in fact go into the Black Book. A point may
arise out of a recent change to the Act which has had an unexpectedly nega-
tive effect in some obscure situation.
One of the most important sources of public input is the result of a
relatively new technique which is being employed by Finance: the solicitation
of response to a paper issued by Finance. The solicitation may be made in a
number of different ways, such as a Green Paper, the issuance of a press
release or a private request. In the past few years, this approach has been
taken with charities reform, the capital cost allowance system, the sales tax
system, and every new treaty negotiation. In each case, Finance has had its
own views on what should be done, but wanted a better idea of what was
actually going on "in the real world." It should be stressed that these are not
18 The Queen v. Wipf (1976), 30 D.T.C. 6059, affirmed by the Supreme Court of
Canada without reasons in [1976] C.T.C. 57. This led to the enactment of section 143
of the Act, dealing with the taxation of Hutterite Colonies.
19 The Queen v. Quinn (1973), 27 D.T.C. 5215; [1973] C.T.C. 258 led to the
passage of section 146.1 of the Act dealing with registered education savings plans.
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simply public relations exercises, but rather attempts to get input from those
parts of the public which will be most directly affected by the proposed
changes and which have the most intimate knowledge of how they themselves
operate. The procedure which led up to the major revisions in the Act re-
lating to charities may be instructive.
The study began as routine departmental work arising out of a commit-
ment by the former Minister of Finance, the Honourable E. J. Benson, at the
time of tax reform, to look into a new definition of charity. The work was
carried on internally and a report was prepared on the subject. The report
raised many issues relating to charities and their taxation, dealing primarily
with vagaries of the law, possibilities for tax avoidance, etc. At about the
same time, there had been widespread newspaper reports of extremely high
fund-raising expenses in charities. On the basis of the Departmental report,
officers were asked to go into the subject in more depth in order to recom-
mend changes in the Act. At this stage, a year-long internal study was under-
taken, culminating in another report with recommendations.
The officers involved were concerned that they did not have enough
knowledge of the day to day operations of many types of charities, and were
afraid that the changes proposed might interfere significantly with the work of
charities without achieving significant policy objectives. It was therefore de-
cided to issue a "Green Paper"; 20 this format is designed to put forward
tentative conclusions but not commit the government. Indeed, a Green Paper
was particularly appropriate because the paper represented extreme positions
which, in fact, were not strongly supported. The expectation was that those
who were most affected would respond quickly and vehemently, and this
proved to be correct.
There were several hundred written responses and meetings were set
up between officials and those who wished to make representations. In point
of fact, a great deal of new information was obtained during these meetings,
some of it reinforcing beliefs already held by the officials about abuses by
the charities, some of it requiring a revision of views.
The legislation resulting from this exercise was tabled less than a year
after the issuance of the Green Paper; the proposed reforms received, for the
most part, genuine acceptance. There is no doubt that the "public" in this
case had a very significant input into tax legislation as it was ultimately
enacted.
2. Sources of Input into Budgetary Changes
Both the process and the inputs relating to budgetary changes are very
different from those relating to the so-called technical changes. The two major
factors in the budgetary decisions are the government's fiscal objectives and
the politics of change, although the latter is subordinate to the former. The
determination of the fiscal stance of the government at any given time is the
primary task of the Fiscal Policy and Economics Analysis Branch at Finance,
which is composed almost entirely of economists. The divisions of this Branch
20 The Green Paper was issued with the Budget of June 23, 1975.
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monitor the economy prior to any Budget and report their views as to what
would be the appropriate fiscal stance. Those of their specific recommenda-
tions which relate to the Income Tax Act are often a source of friction be-
tween Fiscal and Tax Policy officials.
The political element comes into play in determining what tax changes
should be made, if any, to implement the fiscal policy, and to get the best
political mileage, or to minimize political damage. It should be pointed out
that, for the most part, fiscal changes which take place through tax amend-
ments tend to have a much higher profile than those which, for instance, are
implemented through a change in expenditure programmes or monetary policy.
For example, a programme such as the registered home ownership savings
plan has great political value, while a programme attempting to curb house
prices by making direct grants to municipalities, in order to encourage the
servicing of raw land, has little immediate appeal to most taxpayers.
The role of the public in the budgetary changes is minimal. Letters from
the public, for instance, generally ask for tax cuts and rarely try to put such
requests into any sort of fiscal framework. Requests from the more formal
interest groups tend to reflect self-interest; while their readings of the eco-
nomy are of some interest, they rarely have much effect on the decision-
making process. One of the reasons for this, undoubtedly, is that there is
rarely any sort of consensus between such groups as to the appropriate meas-
ures which should be taken, and this lack of consensus tends to make all the
analyses suspect.
A similar lack of consensus, however, is apparent among the Finance
economists who assess the situation in the first place. Rarely is there total
agreement on the appropriate fiscal stance; even when a decision is ultimately
made, it is even more difficult to agree on the steps which should be taken
to implement the proposals.
Once the goals have been determined, broad outlines of strategy are
laid out for most of the staff (except the fairly junior members), and they
are requested to come up with suggestions for implementation. At least once
during the pre-Budget period there will be a meeting between the economists
and the tax policy officials at which various income tax options are discussed
and cost estimates prepared. These are usually forwarded to a group, consist-
ing of the senior officials of the Branches in question, which rejects some of
the options, while ear-marking others for further study.
Detailed assessments are then prepared of the proposals, and a prelimin-
ary draft is done of the most likely ones. This is necessary because of the time
constraints. Many of the meetings referred to above will have taken place
after the date of the Budget has been announced, and there is tremendous
time pressure. At about this time, the technical provisions are also being
"cleaned up," and usually these will be ready before the budgetary measures.
During this immediate pre-Budget period, working days of fourteen to sixteen
hours are not uncommon.
The final decision in all budgetary proposals lies with the Minister, al-
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though naturally the advice of senior advisers will be of prime importance.
The Cabinet per se plays little role in this process. When a particular budget-
ary proposal impinges on the operation of another department, however,
there may be some discreet discussions which take place at the top civil
service level or between Ministers.
The key meeting between the Minister of Finance and the Prime Minister
takes place ten days to two weeks before the Budget Speech. This meeting,
attended by senior advisers from both Ministers' staffs, consists of the Minis-
ter of Finance's presentation of the contents and rationale of his proposed
Budget. The Prime Minister has a de facto veto power over the budgetary
measures at this meeting. It seems clear that the relationship between the two
Ministers is of prime importance at this meeting. If the Prime Minister has
a lot of confidence in his Minister of Finance, all the proposals will be ac-
cepted. If, as has happened in recent years, the relationship is less than cor-
dial, the meeting may be akin to a negotiation between sovereign states-
formal, polite, but characterized by a certain degree of suspicion. The approval
of the Prime Minister is the major hurdle which must be overcome. From the
point of view of Finance officials, this meeting presents a problem in that the
Prime Minister's staff does not have the technical expertise to challenge the
proposals by Finance on tax grounds. So the challenges may be based on
political considerations which are alien to Finance, or on grounds which are
economically or technically unsound. As a general proposition, however, the
Minister of Finance must either be successful in obtaining the Prime Minister's
approval, or recognize that the Prime Minister lacks confidence in his ability.
The imposition of wage and price controls immediately following the departure
of John Turner, only a few months after his last Budget, is perhaps an illus-
tration of such a situation.
The Cabinet itself does not see the Budget until the last week before the
Speech. Because the Prime Minister has by this time already approved the
contents, it is unusual for any change to be taken as a result of Cabinet
deliberations, although changes have been made up to seventy-two hours
before the Budget.21
The final, yet crucial, source of input into the budgetary process is the
draftsman. It is the nature of budgetary decision-making that broad instruc-
tions are issued with regard to the proposals. These instructions set out the
gist of the required changes, and the cost constraints, but leave it to the "ex-
perts" to implement them. Because the implementation must be part of the
Ways and Means motion tabled on Budget night, this requires that a virtually
complete draft be ready four to five days before the Budget. It should be
pointed out that since senior officials are almost always engaged in meetings
during this period, the draftsmen have to make their own decisions on the
technicalities of the measure without further advice or instruction. In drafting
a proposal such as the registered home ownership saving plan, literally dozens
21 The printing of the Budget is a practical constraint on Cabinet amendment prior
to the Speech, since the Budget package must be printed and distributed nation-wide
before the Minister delivers his address in the House.
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of technical decisions had to be made by the draftsmen without any direction
from their superiors, and these decisions ultimately shaped the nature of the
plan as first presented.
The importance of the role of the draftsman can be seen when one
considers that his draft is the basis of the Ways and Means motion, to the
extent that the contents of the Bill, as ultimately presented, cannot be any
more restrictive than the motion. So-called "relieving" changes can be made
on second reading in the House of Commons, and in recent years it has not
been uncommon to see a score or more of such second reading amendments
made, although the Minister and the officials are reluctant to make such
changes. Any tightening of a particular provision of the Bill usually has to
wait for a subsequent Budget.
For the most part, neither the backbenchers nor the Senate have a signi-
ficant role in amending budgetary provisions. A change is occasionally made
in a technical area if it can be characterized as something essentially within
the area of officialdom, but a change in a budgetary amendment is a direct
challenge to the Minister's own decision, and few Ministers would be pre-
pared to publicly admit an error in judgment.22
E. CONCLUSION
Lawyers, like most segments of society, have their own complaints about
the Income Tax Act, which range from the burden of taxation to the com-
plexity of the provisions. But lawyers also have the task of advocating changes
on behalf of their clients. The purpose of this article has been to explain the
nature of the process of amending the Income Tax Act; with an understanding
of the process, lawyers are better equipped to participate effectively.
In advocating any proposal, the lawyer should first assess it to determine
who would benefit and who would bear the burden if it were adopted, and
recognize that a host of inequities may result from any proposed change.
Second, the financial and administrative cost to the government of any pro-
posed change should be considered. Third, the request for change must be
made to the proper official. If one has contacts within the Department, they
should not be used as advocates, but rather to provide an introduction to the
person whom one must convince, the anonymous official who effectively con-
trols the area in which the change falls.
Lawyers work most effectively through the Joint Committee of the Bar
Association and the CICA. No other group gets a more respectful hearing
from the officials and the approval of this Committee can only help the cause.
22Walter Gordon was forced to abandon some of the key proposals of his first
Budget and as a result, seriously impaired his credibility as Minister of Finance, ulti-
mately giving way to Mitchell Sharp. The experience was often cited as a horrible ex-
ample of politics interfering with sound proposals. It is noteworthy that in that first
Budget, the key proposals were prepared without consultation with the top officials of
Finance and Revenue. Peter C. Newman's book on the period, The Distemper of Our
Times, was recommended reading for new recruits at Finance.
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Finally, one should know one's limitations. Suggestions for an across-
the-board tax cut, a long-term deferral of taxes for an entire industry, or a
change which will benefit only one's largest client are probably unrealistic.
On the other hand, the Department recognizes its lack of expertise in many
areas and is willing to hear about legal problems with which a lawyer and
his clients may be faced. The officers are not always familiar with the legisla-
tion of the various provinces and its relationship with the tax provisions, and
would welcome assistance from lawyers in this area. The Bar has a major
and important role to play in tax changes and this role will be effective only
if the lawyer understands the rules and abides by them. By so doing, he may
well aid not only his client but also, ideally, the Department.

